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1 Introduction
Antitrust authorities recently have dealt with a number of cases where collusion between down-
stream rms was induced or facilitated by a common supplier. Although this involves some vertical
agreement between the supplier (the hub) and his buyers (the spokes) the legal doctrine that
emerged from handling these cases was also inuential for the view the European Commission holds
on horizontal agreements.1
Economic analysis has shown the di¢ culties in implementing a collusive (horizontal) agreement.
Firms participating in a cartel have to reach an agreement, detect defectors, and nd an appropriate
way to punish those who deviate from the agreement, see Osborne (1986). Subsequent contributions
have introduced facilitating practices and the possibility to commit to a variety of punishment
strategies to reach a tacit agreement to implement the monopoly outcome in an oligopoly market
structure, see resp. Holt and Sche¤man (1987) and Porter (1983).
The possible role that a common upstream supplier could play in the reach of a collusive
outcome however remains relatively unexplored, see however Mathewson and Winter (1998) for a
survey of the possible uses of vertical restraints to reduce interbrand competition. In the present
contribution the focus lies on the possibility to reduce intra-brand competition. In its simplest
format then, collusion between two downstream rms is made possible through the interaction of
the downstream rms D1 and D2 (the spokes) with a common, upstream supplier U (the hub).
The present contribution investigates the role that this third party can have in disciplining the
cartel. Hence it explores the incentives for U to enter into a cartel agreement where U participates
in the punishment if either D1 or D2 deviates from the collusive agreement. Related issues involve
the role that U could have in reaching an agreement between D1 and D2 or in detecting and
disclosing defection by D1 to D2 or vice versa.
The model that is introduced to investigate this issue assumes that collusion between the down-
stream rms D1 and D2 is feasible and protable. Legal analysis refers to this assumption by the
requirement that there exists a rimto bind all the spokes together in a single conspiracy.2 This
implies that the spokes are aware of each others existence and conscious that interaction with the
hub propagates the cartel outcome.3
1See Odudu (2010) for a recent study on the legal doctrine dealing with hub and spoke collusion and Camesasaca,
Schmidt and Clancy (2010) for a critical investigation of the Draft of Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements.
2The need to have a collusive agreement between the downstream rms was established by the European Com-
mission in the Pioneer decision, see Odudu (2010), o.c.
3A similar doctrine was used in the so called Bananas case where the European Commission absent a full
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The question therefore is: what contributionto cartel stability could the hub make beyond
what is in reach of the spokes when acting on their own, and when will the hub be willing to provide
this support for the downstream cartel? Equivalently, in what way can the hub enlarge the strategy
space as to make a di¤erence should the game reach the punishment stage. And is the hub willing
to take this action whenever necessary?
Both questions are answered in the a¢ rmative for a strategy where the hub U cuts the deviating
downstream rm from its supply chain. By refusing to further supply a downstream deviator
(removing the spoke), the cartel becomes more stable compared to a cartel that has to rely on a
price war on the rim for punishing deviation. The supplier prefers to take up short the downstream
deviator because price wars lead to renegotiations that reduce the intermediate or transferprice
at which the upstream player sells to the downstream rms.
Refusals to deal are far better known from industry congurations where a vertically integrated
monopolist denies access to a downstream (potential) competitor, see Salop (2010).4 A few examples
illustrate that a strategy where a supplier refuses to deal further with a previous buyer that deviated
from a collusive agreement, has ample empirical relevance. These examples show precisely how this
type of cartel operates. French antitrust authorities (see Conseil de la Concurrence, 2004) convicted
leniency discount would have imposed higher nes upon Chiquita, a player who was in a cartel and who could
foresee that his horizontal competitor and collusive partner (Dole) also was colluding with still another horizontal
competitor, Weichert. The latter who did not see the gran collusive scheme, not presuming that if Dole was colluding
with them, Dole was most likely also colluding with Chiquita, got away with a lower ne. This illustrates the same
doctrine of being held liable for what collusive action can mean in terms of reaching a collusive outcome with others.
Van Cayseele and Camesasca (2010) show why such an approach is nonsensical in terms of the economics of cartel
enforcement.
4 Interestingly, Case Law as in Trinko has been concerned with the collusive e¤ect that could result from forcing
access into the monopolists supply chain, as a remedy. The immanent negotiations on access price are seen to
possibly facilitate the operation of a cartel. Salop (2010) is critical vis-a-vis this argument since absent access, there
is no downstream competition at all, or the existing monopoly situation hardly can be better than a collusive duopoly.
This point undoubtedly is valid in a static context, but consider the situation where a potential entrant could pursue
an innovative strategy that circumvents the essential facility of the incumbent monopoly, although at large di¢ culty.
Compare this to the legal strategy that is far easier when refusals to deal are per se illegal. The entrant might be
inclined to give up the di¢ cult innovative path and apply for access. The incumbent might be inclined to grant this
access knowing that the entrant then will abandon his research project. Once this happened, the entrant can be made
a weak competitor and forced into collusion by threatening to cut him of the supply chain, precisely according to the
mechanism put forward in the present article, hence compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the
supreme evil of antitrust: collusion(as quoted in Salop on page 714).
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TSL for the refusal to supply snow shoes to GO SPORT, a nationwide distributor of sports articles.
Decathlon, a competitor to GO SPORT, had complained with TSL that it could not maintain a
substantive margin if GO SPORT priced frequently below the agreed upon resale price.5 In the
same jurisdiction, one year later, Panasonic, Philips and Sony got convicted for exerting pressure
on wholesalers not to supply retailers that deviated from the recommended sales price.
A similar case occurred in the US where La Z Boy Chair Company threatened World of
Sleep, a high volume price discounter of furniture.6 La Z Boy Chair Company had conspired
with competitors of World of Sleep to maintain retail prices. One of these competitors, Montgomery
Ward, complained to La Z Boy Chair Company that World of Sleep ran a series of television
commercials comparing the price of La Z Boy chairs to the higher prices in Montgomery Wards
catalogue. Still other examples have been noticed by the European Commission when supervising
the market integration process. A supplier who divided the market in territories (that coincided
with the member states) refused to supply a distributor in one country when he found out that
this supplier participated in parallel imports from his own country into a neighboring one where
the product was sold at a more expensive price.
 Literature. A market in which a common supplier threatens to punish buyers who defect on a
collusive agreement that exists between all of them resembles a resale price maintenance agreement.
RPM has been looked at from the perspective of a (mostly forbidden) regime in which suppliers
determine the end prices to consumers. Dobson and Waterson (2007) compare a RPM regime
to a situation in which the suppliers only determine the intermediate prices to the distributors
who then set the nal consumer price in competition with the rival distributors. This model
incorporates bargaining and double marginalization aspects in evaluating welfare with and without
RPM. The model introduced in the present article is close to their analytical framework. But the
focus is di¤erent in that we investigate a covert agreement (as opposed to an overt RPM for which
an exemption on the competition rules exists) where the supplier does not determine the nal
consumer price but rather suggests the collusive price and then stabilizes the downstream cartel by
5This case is characterized by the use of an additional extension of the strategy space of Bertrand pricing games
by the fact that Decathlon (the competitor) with the help of TSL (the supplier) bought the snow shoes that were
o¤ered by GO SPORT at the discounted price. The buying of a rivals output has been investigated extensively in
Van Cayseele and Furth (1996). The implications for cartel arrangements notably the prot sharing rule have been
made clear in Van Cayseele and Furth (2001).
6La Z Boy Chair Company told World of Sleep that: We dont want any big price wars, and that they would
do everything to get these wars stopped even if it has to come down to being drastic about it.
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refusing to deal further with those who deviate from the collusive price.
Jullien and Rey (2007) analyze RPM from the perspective of the detection of deviation from
the collusive scheme. They investigate the trade-o¤ between the increased probability of detection
under RPM on the one hand against the suboptimal pricing with inexible prices under RPM on
the other hand. Price inexibility has a cost in the presence of demand shocks. Tacit collusion
is implemented by reverting to punishment after that a deviation has been detected as in the
model presented in section 2 below. The main di¤erence lies in the focus on collusion between
manufacturers rather than retailers and the stochastic nature of demand that masks deviation
from the agreement. In the stage game all the bargaining power resides with the manufacturer
whereas in the model introduced below the relative strength of the parties matters for the outcome.
Work on two-part tari¤s has indicated how competing manufacturers can maintain the monopoly
outcome if they sell through a monopoly retailer, see Bernheim and Whinston (1985) and OBrien
and Sha¤er (1997). In some way this industry structure mirrors the one under investigation (here):
the monopoly position is on the retailer (supplier) side and hence the focus is on dampening
inter(intra) brand competition. Recent work on vertical relations by Rey and Vergé (2010) and
Inderst and Sha¤er (2010) shows that the contractual relations between suppliers and retailers that
facilitate collusion are more complex when inter-and intrabrand competition need to be dealt with
at the same time. This work therefore respectively focusses on the use of RPM and Market-Share
contracts to achieve the joint goal of limiting intra- and interbrand competition.
The present model casts a practice in which a supplier voluntarily contributes to the stability of
a retailer cartel by refusing to supply a retailer that deviated from the cartel price. The upstream
rm might be pleased with downstream collusion, as erce competition in the downstream market
can drive transfer prices (and hence upstreams prots) down to zero. Therefore, the enforcement
of a cartel outcome becomes all the more important and the possibilities o¤ered by an embargo on
deviators all the more relevant.
A refusal to deal could be institutionalized by means of the frequently observed technique
of non-binding retail price recommendations (RPRs). A manufacturer then recommends each
retailer to implement their own cartel price, and communicates that deviations from this price will
be met by an embargo. In order to be able to execute a strategy of stopping the supply to a
retailer, the upstream rm can contractually foresee this contingency, so courts cannot force the
supplier to furnish the retailer that was cut o¤. This could be done by including a clause that if
insu¢ cient promotional activities were undertaken, the supplier no longer is in the obligation to
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provide the product. Everybody of course would understand that a price falling below the cartel
price is tantamount to no longer being able to sustain su¢ cient promotional activity.
This is not to say that RPRs cannot serve other purposes or that industries that rely on
RPR are by denition cartelized. On the contrary, Buehler and Gärtner (2010) investigate the
rationale of these RPRs from the perspective of enhancing the overall e¢ ciency of a supplier
retailer relationship under asymmetry of information. In the present contribution the RPR can be
seen as a trigger for punishment by the supplier whenever he chooses to participate in the policing
of a downstream cartel, indicating that the motivation for such an arrangement is quite di¤erent
in our model.
An interesting strand of research with a close link to the present analysis is the explanation
for the existence of medieval merchant guilds by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994). These
organizations precisely used embargoes against foreign rulers that did not respect the property
rights of the merchants that were a member of the guild. Greif, Milgrom and Weingast make
several interesting points vis-a-vis the optimal organizational structure to sustain e¢ cient levels of
trade. The most prominent one is that bilateral or even multilateral reputational mechanisms are
insu¢ cient to sustain optimal levels of trade. The merchant guild needs to ensure that individual
members or third parties do not circumvent the boycott. This is achieved by denition in the model
investigated in this article by the fact that we focus on a single upstream supplier that can commit
also his future types to no deliveries should a downstream player ever defect.
Another point raised by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast is that foreign rulers who were far more
powerful than the merchant guilds nonetheless encouraged the establishment of merchant guild
o¢ ces that helped monitoring and implementing a full boycott. Why would a foreign ruler that
is military so powerful that he could easily avoid the establishment of such an o¢ ce cede to the
installation of one, even if it means that the possibility to rob a number of individual merchants
ends? Because merchants understood that only a very limited number of them could trade based on
individual reputational enforcement, trade would never develop to the e¢ cient level since only the
inframarginal trader was safe while the marginal one was prone to conscation. The establishment
of a guild that could punish individual traders that circumvented a full boycott then was the
protection for the marginal one, allowing trade to develop to an e¢ cient level. The ruler thus
allows the building up of bargaining power on the other sidebecause the leverage of the increased
punishment allows the implementation of a more e¢ cient equilibrium.
This point is fully articulated and investigated in the present context where we show that the
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supplier equally allows for the building up of bargaining power on the buyer side when he cuts of
a spoke. From a situation where he bargains with two buyers and therefore has a threat point
to deal exclusively with one distributor, he moves toward bilateral monopoly where in failure of a
deal with the remaining player, he has no outlet for his product at all. But as with the guild, this
may benet the supplier because stronger punishment achieves coordination between the buyers
inducing them to remain in the cartel.
We rst show that U might have a common interest withD1 andD2 in building up market power
on the downstream market. This enables the buyers to pay a higher transfer price, which can turn
out to be benecial for U . Given this common interest, we then investigate how the supplier can
contribute to the stability of the downstream cartel. We show that when one introduces a strategy
where U no longer supplies a defector in the downstream cartel, punishment is harder as compared
to any case where the defector can remain in the game. As such this strategy supports collusion
for lower discount factors than the more lenient innite grim strategies that rely on reversal to
non-cooperative play. However, the cost of refusing to supply is borne by both the defector and the
supplier, so in order for the latter to participate, a number of conditions need to be fullled. It is
shown that only in a very limited number of cases, the supplier will participate in the punishment
scheme and refuse to supply because the conditions that are required tend to be quite demanding.
Only when the buyers are involved in strong price competition among themselves and they have
su¢ cient bargaining power vis-a-vis the seller, is the seller willing to impose an embargo to stabilize
the downstream cartel.
The remainder of this article then is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the
basic model and investigate four stage game outcomes of interest. Comparing these outcomes we
then demonstrate the common interest in the formation of a retail cartel. In the third section we
consider the repeated game and show the conditions for which hub and spoke collusion by embargo
works. The fourth section expands this model in several directions while the fth and last section
concludes by pointing to the implications for the legal practice that develops at the EC by trying
to lump di¤erent forms of conspiracy into one single infringement.
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2 The Stage Game
2.1 Assumptions
The most basic industry conguration that can be used to investigate the impact that a supplier
can have on the stability of a downstream cartel has one upstream manufacturer U and two down-
stream retailers denoted by D1 and D2. The product is manufactured by U , but the downstream
rms add value by making it available to the nal consumers, who have heterogeneous tastes re-
garding the retail shops they patronize. The manufacturer can choose which retailers he is willing
to do business with. After making this supply choice, bilateral negotiations take place to determine
the linear transfer price g that each retailer must pay to acquire the product. For simplicity Us
cost of manufacturing the product is normalized to zero.
Following Dobson and Waterson (1997), we assume that retailer Dis indirect demand is linear
and given by the following expression:
pi = 1  qi   
P
j 6=i
qj ;  2 [0; 1) (1)
whenever this is positive. The parameter  measures the degree of substitutability between the
di¤erent retailers. If  = 0, each retailer is considered to o¤er an independent service, whereas if
 ! 1, retailersproducts are perfect substitutes to each other. For our subsequent analysis it is
useful to highlight two properties of this demand structure. First of all, aggregate demand for the
nal product is increasing in the number of retailers. To highlight this property it su¢ ces to derive
the direct demand for both the monopoly and duopoly downstream conguration. Whenever the
downstream market is characterized by a duopoly, retailer is direct demand is given by
qN=2i (pi; pj) =
pj   pi
1  2 +
1  pj
1 + 
; (2)
such that at equal prices total demand is given by 2 (1  p) = (1 + ). A monopolistic retailer i on
the other hand faces the following demand:
qN=1i (pi) = 1  pi (3)
It is then clear that qN=2 (p; p) < qN=1 (p) < 2qN=2 (p; p) whenever  2 (0; 1). This market expan-
sion e¤ect is inherent in many types of product di¤erentiation models. From the manufacturers
point of view dealing with two retailers has the advantage of having access to a larger downstream
market. Secondly, in the duopoly conguration an increase in the di¤erentiation parameter  de-
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creases total demand and makes each retailers demand more elastic.7 Less di¤erentiated retailers
will thus compete more ercely for a smaller market.
The entire game consists of a three-stage stage game that is innitely repeated. All parties
are informed and aware of actions that occurred in prior stages, and prots are discounted by a
common discount factor . In the rst stage the manufacturer indicates which retailers he is willing
to trade with (conditional upon reaching an agreement on the transfer price). The manufacturer
may choose to deal with both retailers or restrict the availability of his product to a single retailer.
In the second stage the manufacturer negotiates with the chosen retailers over the transfer prices.
The bargained transfer prices are obtained using the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The
exact formulation of the Nash bargaining problem depends on the manufacturers supply decision
and retailer conduct, and will be specied later on. For now it su¢ ces to know that  2 [0; 1)
denotes the bargaining power of the retailer(s) relative to the manufacturer. Whenever  = 0,
the manufacturer has full bargaining power and can set the transfer price freely. We exclude the
trivial case in which retailers have all bargaining power (i.e.  = 1), as in that case transfer prices
(and hence manufacturer prots) will be driven down to zero, leaving the manufacturer completely
indi¤erent about retailer conduct. In the last stage, retailers simultaneously set the prices they
charge to the nal consumers, p1 and p2.
2.2 Stage Game Outcomes
Before proceeding to the analyze the repeated game, we rst consider four particular out-
comes of the stage game that are of special interest. In the rst two outcomes, retailers behave
non-cooperatively and the supplier decides either to supply to one retailer (monopoly) or both
retailers (non-cooperative duopoly). Next, we consider a situation in which retailers form a cartel
(cartel), in which case the manufacturer always prefers to supply to both cartelizing retailers. We
will then compare prots across the regimes, and demonstrate that a manufacturer might actually
prefer to deal with cartel of retailers. This will lead us to ask which role the manufacturer might
play in sustaining cartel stability. For the sake of evaluating cartel stability, we also consider the
outcome in which one retailer deviates (optimally) from the cartel agreement (deviation). Such
7The expression for the elasticity of demand is given by
"i (pi; pj) =  @q
D
i
@pi
pi
qDi
=
pi
(1  pi)   (1  pj) ;
which clearly is increasing in .
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deviations should be unprotable if the cartel is to survive.
Monopoly
When the manufacturer credibly commits to dealing with a single retailer only, the downstream
market is characterized by a retail monopoly. Such a monopoly does not have access to the full
market, but is not subjected to competitive pressure from other retailers either. A monopolistic
retailer might therefore accept a higher transfer price, as it is not associated with a competitive
cost-disadvantage in the downstream market due to a lack of competition.
A monopolist maximizes its prot M (p; g) = (p  g) qN=1 (p) by setting its retail price equal
to
pM (g) =
1 + g
2
, (4)
which results in the following quantity sold
qM (g) =
1  g
2
: (5)
When the manufacturer bargains over the transfer price with a retail monopolist, the outside option
for both parties is zero. This is because in case the negotiations break down, each party can not earn
positive prots by dealing with a third party. If the negotiations do succeed, each party earns the
respective monopoly-case prots. The transfer price gM therefore solves the following generalized
Nash bargaining problem:
gM = argmax
g
V =

MD (g)  0
 
MU (g)  0
1 
, (6)
where MD (g) =

pM (g)  g qM (g) and MU (g) = g  qM (g). The solution to this bargaining
problem is given by:
gM =
1  
2
, (7)
which is decreasing in . An increase in retailer bargaining power  yields a more favorable outcome
for the retailer and hence reduces the transfer price. The associated equilibrium price and quantity
are then given by
pM =
3  
4
(8)
qM =
1 + 
4
(9)
The following lemma summarizes both partiesprots in the retail monopoly regime.
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Lemma 1 Monopoly prots are given by:
MD =
1
16
(1 + )2 (10)
MU =
1
8
 
1  2 (11)
Non-Cooperative Duopoly
Next we consider what happens when both retailers are being supplied to and retailers behave
non-cooperatively. Retailers now have (combined) access to a larger market, but compete against
one another. This competitive pressure drives down transfer prices, as retailers are reluctant to
accept a transfer price that would result in a competitive cost-disadvantage in the downstream
market.
A non-cooperative retailer i sets its price as to maximize its own prot NCDi (pi; pj) = [pi   gi] qN=2i (pi; pj),
given the price set by Dj . This results in the following best-response price:
pBRi (pj) =
1
2
(1 + gi    (1  pj)) (12)
For a given set of transfer prices, the non-cooperative price-setting equilibrium is therefore given
by
pNCi (gi; gj) =
2 (gi   gj) 
4  2 + (1  ) + gj(2  ) (13)
such that Di sells the following quantity
qNCi (gi; gj) =

2  2
(2  ) (1 + ) 2  2    [gj   gi] + 1(2  ) (1 + ) [1  gj ] (14)
When the manufacturer bargains with two non-cooperative retailers, the outside option of
each retailer is zero, as there is no alternative source of supply. The manufacturer can however
deal with the remaining retailer in case negotiations break down with the other retailer. The
manufacturers disagreement payo¤ is therefore now positive. In line with the literature we assume
that the manufacturer negotiates bilaterally with each of the retailers over a separate transfer price
gi. We also assume that if negotiations break down with one retailer, this is observed by the other
retailer. The latter will therefore realize he is a monopolist and reactaccordingly by setting the
monopoly price pM (g) derived earlier. The set of transfer prices gNC =
 
gNC1 ; gNC2

therefore
solves the following bargaining problem:
gNCi = argmaxgi
Vi =

NCDi (gi; gj)  0
 
NCU (gi; gj)  MU (gj)
1 
, i = f1; 2g , j 6= i (15)
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where NCDi (gi; gj) =

pNCi (gi; gj)  gi

qNCi (gi; gj), 
NC
U (gi; gj) =
P
i giqNCi (gi; gj) and MU (gj) =
gj  qM (gj). The symmetric solution to this bargaining problem is given by:
gNC =
(1  ) (2   (1 + ))
4   (1 + ) (2   (2  ))  g
M; (16)
which is (i) (weakly) smaller than the monopolistic transfer price gM, (ii) decreasing in , and (iii)
decreasing , approaching zero when the downstream market becomes undi¤erentiated (i.e.  ! 1).
Increasing retailer bargaining power again yields a more favorable, and hence lower, transfer price
for the retailers. The degree of substitutability increases the retailers overall bargaining power,
and hence decreases the negotiated transfer price. The less di¤erentiated the downstream market,
the more erce retailer competition becomes. Retailers are therefore unwilling to accept a high
transfer price, as this would lead to an important cost disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitor. The
manufacturer is willing to accept a low transfer price, as in case of disagreement it would lose
a signicant amount of sales by dealing with a monopolist only. Interestingly, the transfer price
converges to zero when the downstream market approaches an undi¤erentiated market. In such a
market, the manufacturers prot approaches zero as well, which might motivate the manufacturer
to undertake actions that avoid competition in the retail market.
The associated equilibrium price and quantity are given by
pNC =
(1  ) + gNC
2   (17)
qNC =
1  gNC
(1 + ) (2  ) (18)
The prots under the competitive regime are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Non-cooperative prots are given by:
NCD =
(1  )  1  gNC2
(1 + ) (2  )2 (19)
NCU =
2gNC
 
1  gNC
(1 + ) (2  ) (20)
Cartel
When both retailers are being supplied to, these retailers might conspire to collude in order
to remove the competitive pressure from their pricing decision. Such collusive behavior in pricing
generates additional market power in the downstream market, such that the cartel is able to set a
higher markups. It also implies that retailers are willing to accept a higher transfer price, as retailers
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no longer have a strong incentive to have a transfer price that is lower than their competitors.
Retailers can take the cartel one step further, by also colluding during transfer price negotiations.
This will allow them to negotiate a more favorable transfer price.
A downstream cartel sets its price as to maximize the joint prot, given the negotiated transfer
prices. We assume that retailers also collude during transfer price negotiations, and that the
outcome of the bargaining process is a single transfer price g that applies to both colluding retailers.
The cartel therefore sets its prices as to maximize the joint prot
P
i (pi   g) qN=2i (pi; pj). This
prot is maximized by setting both retail prices equal to
pC (g) =
1 + g
2
; (21)
which was also the price a monopolistic retailer would set. Retailer sales are now given by
qC (g) =
1  g
2 (1 + )
(22)
The transfer price is determined by a bargaining procedure between the manufacturer and a
single identity representing the cartelizing retailers. Whenever the negotiations fail, both parties
will therefore leave empty-handed and obtain a zero prot. The transfer price gC therefore solves:
gC = argmax
g
V C (g) =

2CD (g)  0
 
CU (g)  0
1 
(23)
where CD (g) =

pC (g)  g qC (g) and CU (g) = g  2qC (g). The solution to this bargaining
problem is given by:
gC =
1  
2
; (24)
which is the same transfer price a monopolistic retailer would be able to negotiate. Notice that
the product di¤erentiation parameter  does not a¤ect transfer prices, as both the surplus of the
cartel and the manufacturer are proportional to (1 + ) 1.8 Increasing  reduces overall demand
but does not change the collusive price. Both parties are therefore a¤ected in the same way, so the
transfer price does not change. An increase in retailer bargaining power  yields a more favorable
outcome for retailers and hence reduces the transfer price. Plugging in this transfer price we have
that the resulting collusive outcome is given by
pC =
3  
4
(25)
qC =
(1 + )
4 (1 + )
(26)
8 In particular, CDi (g) =

1
1+
  
1 g
2
2
and CU (g) =

1
1+

g (1  g).
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The prots under the cartel regime are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 Cartel prots
CD =
(1 + )2
16 (1 + )
(27)
CU =
1  2
4 (1 + )
(28)
We now proceed to compare prots under the three di¤erent regimes. Unsurprisingly, retailers
prefer the collusive outcome over the non-cooperative outcome, but each retailer would even more
like to be a monopolist.
Proposition 4 The retailers preferences over the di¤erent retailer congurations are characterized
by NCD < 
C
D < 
M
D :
A more interesting comparison arises with the manufacturers prots. For the manufacturer,
the trade-o¤ between the di¤erent retailer congurations is one of sales value versus transfer price.
For a given transfer price, the manufacturers preferences over the di¤erent retailer congurations
are given by NCU (g) > 
C
U (g) > 
M
U (g). Sales are highest when dealing with non-cooperative
retailers, as they have access to a large market and charge low markups due to retailer competition.
A cartel of retailers also has access to a large market, but generates fewer sales as the lack of retailer
competition allows for higher retail price markups. A monopolistic retailer generates the lowest
amount of sales, as such a retailer sets an equally high markup as a cartel, but only has access
to a small market. Transfer price vary across the di¤erent congurations. In particular, we have
that gNC  gC = gM, so that the manufacturer earns a lower transfer price by dealing with
non-cooperative duopolists.
Combining both the transfer price and sales e¤ect, it is clear that the manufacturer always
prefers to deal with a cartel of retailers instead of a single monopolistic retailer. In both cases the
negotiated transfer price is the same, but the cartel has access to a larger market which results
in higher sales for the manufacturer. The ranking of the non-cooperative prot relative to the
cartel and monopoly prot depends crucially on the relative bargaining power  and the degree of
di¤erentiation . The next Proposition fully characterizes the manufacturers preferences.
Proposition 5 There exist two strictly decreasing functions, C ()  M (), such that the man-
ufacturers preferences over the di¤erent retailer congurations are characterized by:
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Figure 1: Manufacturer preferences
I. If  < C (), then MU < 
C
U < 
NC
U
II. If  2 [C () ; M ()], then MU < NCU < CU
III. If  > M (), then NCU < 
M
U < 
C
U
When the manufacturer fully determines the transfer price (i.e.  = 0), the manufacturers
preferences over the three congurations boils down to choosing the regime that generates the
highest amount of sales. Earlier one we saw that, irrespective of the degree of substitution, the
non-cooperative duopoly always generates more sales by having complete access to the market and
charging low markups. The manufacturer will therefore always want to deal with a non-cooperative
duopoly when he has complete bargaining power.
When the manufacturer only has partial bargaining power (i.e. 0 <  < 1), the manufacturers
preferences depend on the degree of di¤erentiation. When the retail market is highly di¤erentiated
(i.e.  < C ()), the manufacturers preferred conguration is a non-cooperative duopoly. For
intermediate ranges of di¤erentiation (i.e.  2 [C () ; M ()]), the non-cooperative duopoly out-
come becomes worse than the cartel outcome, but not the monopoly outcome. When di¤erentiation
is low (i.e.  > M ()), the non-cooperative outcome is the worst overall outcome.
The intuition for this result if the following: When the market is highly di¤erentiated, non-
cooperative duopolists are still willing to accept a high transfer price, as competition is still quite
soft. Compared to the cartel, the transfer price thus decreases, but only slightly. Retailers then pass
on this cost reduction in such a way that sales su¢ ciently increase to overcome the lower transfer
price, hence the manufacturers prot is higher when dealing with the non-cooperative duopoly. As
the market becomes less di¤erentiated, non-cooperative duopolists become increasingly unwilling
to accept high transfer prices, which eventually drives down transfer prices down to zero (when
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 ! 1). At that point retailers set almost zero markups such that sales are high, but at a transfer
price of almost zero the manufacturers prots are driven down to zero as well. In that case it
is clearly benecial for the manufacturer to deal with the cartel. The manufacturers prot when
dealing with a monopolist is una¤ected by di¤erentiation and is lower than the prot from dealing
with a cartel. For intermediate ranges of di¤erentiation the non-cooperative prot will thus lie
somewhere in between the cartel and monopoly prot.
The following Corollary now follows immediately from Proposition 4 and 5.
Corollary 6 For a su¢ ciently low degree of di¤erentiation (i.e.  > C ()), a retailer cartel is
desirable for both retailers and the manufacturer.
When there the degree of di¤erentiation is low, there is an alignment of the preferences of both
retailers and the manufacturer. Both parties would like to avoid competition in the downstream
market, and see a retailer cartel be formed. Intense competition is harmful for retailers as prices
are forced down, and harmful for the manufacturer by driving down the transfer price. As the
manufacturer now also would like a downstream cartel, he might encourage retailers to cartelize
own their own, or even participate actively in sustaining the cartel by cooperating in the punishment
of a deviating retailer. We explore this possibility in the repeated game in a following section. In
order to evaluate cartel stability, we also need to characterize the (optimal) retailer deviation from
the cartel agreement, which will be covered rst.
Deviation
Each retailers has an incentive to deviate from the cartel agreement, as charging the collusive
price is not a best-response. Retailer Dis prot from deviating when Dj charges pC and the
transfer price is gC, is given by
DEVDi
 
pi; p
C =  pi   gC qN=2i  pi; pC (29)
Note that we assume that the resulting transfer price prior to deviation is the same as when
both retailers would charge the collusive price. Implicit here is the assumption that during the
bargaining phase that precedes the deviation, the deviating retailer acts as if he is going to collude
and therefore obtains the same transfer price as the loyal retailer. If this were not the case then
the other retailer would realize that deviation is about to take place and refrain from charging the
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collusive price as well. The optimal one-shot deviation is given by
pDEV D =
1
8
[6      (2 + )] < pC; (30)
and the associated deviation quantity is given by
qDEV D =
1
8
(1 + )
(2  )
1  2 > q
C (31)
The following lemma contains the retailers prot from deviating optimally from the cartel agree-
ment.
Lemma 7 Optimal deviation prot
DEV D =
1
64
(1 + )2
(2  )2
1  2
3 The Repeated Game
The repeated game consists of the aforementioned three-stage game repeated an innite number
of times. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium that can be sustained by trigger-like strategies
in which retailers fully collude in price setting.
3.1 Trigger Strategies
As there are now two types of parties involved (manufacturer and retailer, respectively), who
each have a single instrument at their disposal (supply and pricing decision respectively), trigger
strategies can take on a variety of forms. The trigger strategies we consider are particularly simply
and only depend on the retailers pricing behavior. Both the manufacturer and retailers decision
depend only on the following variables:
 Nt: Number of retailers being supplied to in the current period.
 It : Indicator variable taking on the value 1 if in any past period where both rms were being
supplied (i.e. N = 2), at least one retailer deviated from charging pC.
 IDt : Identity of the retailer that deviated rst from charging pC when both rms were being
supplied. If both retailers deviated rst simultaneously, D1 is taken as default.
16
Retailer strategy: The retailers strategy is a slightly adjusted version of the standard grim
trigger strategy. Each retailer conditions its price on (i) whether or not a deviation from the collusive
price has occurred when both rms were being supplied to (i.e. It), and (ii) the number of retailers
being supplied to in the current period (i.e. Nt). The retailer therefore ignores pricing behavior in
a retailer monopoly and any past supply decisions made by the manufacturer. In particular, the
retailers strategy is given by:
pi;t
 
Nt; I
DEV
t

=
8>>><>>>:
pC if Nt = 2 and It = 0 (collusion)
pNC if Nt = 2 and It = 1 (price war)
pM if Nt = 1 (monopoly)
Whenever both rms are being supplied to, and no price deviation has taken place in the past,
retailers set the collusive price pC. If both rms are being supplied to, but a price deviation
has taken place, retailers revert to non-cooperative pricing by charging pNC. Finally, when the
manufacturer only supplies one retailer, this retailer acts as a monopolist and charges pM.
For the manufacturer we consider two di¤erent types of strategies. The manufacturer (explicitly)
communicates which strategy he will follow at the beginning of the game, such that retailers are
fully aware of the (supply) consequences their pricing decision will have.
Manufacturer strategy I (permanent supply): In the rst type of strategy, the manufacturer does
not actively help to sustain the retail cartel, and supplies both retailers in every period, regardless
of past retailer pricing behavior. The manufacturers strategy is thus given by:
SPSt = fD1; D2g (permanent supply)
Manufacturer strategy II (embargo): In the second type of strategy, the manufacturer does
actively help to sustain the cartel by imposing a permanent embargo on a deviating retailer. The
manufacturer conditions its supply decision only on past retailers pricing behavior. In particular,
the manufacturers strategy is given by:
SEMt
 
IDt ; ID
D
t

=
8<: fD1; D2g if It = 0 (full supply)Di =2 IDt if It = 1 (embargo)
The manufacturer starts o¤ supplying to both rms, and continues to do so as long as no price-
deviation has taken place. When price-deviation(s) takes place, the manufacturer permanently
refuses to supply the retailer that deviated rst. If both retailers deviated rst simultaneously, the
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manufacturer continues to deal only with retailer D1.9
3.2 Equilibrium
In this section we will identify the conditions under which the proposed trigger-like strategies
constitute a (subgame) perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. Given these strategies, all possible
subgames are determined by the two variables on which retailers and/or the manufacturer condition
their behavior, i.e. the number of retailers currently being supplied (Nt) and whether price-deviation
has taken place in the past (It). The manufacturers subgames only depend on It, whereas the
retailers subgames depend both on Nt and It.
Manufacturer Strategies
Retailers only condition their current pricing behavior on past pricing behavior and current
supply. Consequently, the manufacturers supply decision has no dynamic e¤ects; it only a¤ect the
manufacturers prot in the current period. The manufacturer should therefore choose whom to
supply by maximizing the associated stage game prots. Given the retailersstrategy, there are two
types of subgames for the manufacturer to consider.
In the rst type of subgame, no retailer deviation has taken place in the past (i.e. It = 0).
If both retailers are supplied to, they will therefore continue (or start) colluding and charge pC.
Should the retailer decide not to supply to one of the retailers, the remaining retailer will act as
a retail monopolist and charge a price pM. Irrespective of the manufacturers supply decision,
retailers will behave exactly the same in the next period. As the manufacturer strictly prefers to
deal with a cartel instead of a monopoly (see Proposition 5), it will never refuse to supply any of
the colluding retailers as long as no retail price deviation has taken place in the past.
In the second type of subgame, at least one retailer has deviated in the past (i.e. It = 1). When
both retailers are now being supplied, they will behave non-cooperatively and charge pNC. If only
one retailer is being supplied to, it charges pM. Retailers repeat this behavior in the next period,
irrespective of the manufacturers supply decision. By Proposition 5 the manufacturer prefers to
deal with a monopolist instead of a non-cooperative duopoly if and only if (i) the manufacturer
has partial bargaining power (i.e. 0 <  < 1), and (ii) the degree of di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently
low (i.e.  > M ()). As retailers are symmetric, the manufacturer is indi¤erent on which of the
9Alternatively, the manufacturer could choose randomly which retailer he continues to deal with. This would,
however, not alter any of the results.
18
retailers should remain in the market. For the aforementioned levels of di¤erentiation, a retailer
cartel is however also benecial for the manufacturer (as M ()  C ()). It is therefore in the
manufacturers own interest to stabilize the cartel by imposing an embargo on the deviating retailer.
The following Corollary is now apparent.
Corollary 8 The manufacturer voluntarily contributes to the stability of a retailer cartel by im-
posing an embargo on a deviating retailer if and only if (i) retailers have some bargaining power
(i.e. 0 <  < 1), and (ii) the degree of di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently low (i.e.  > M ())
For intermediate levels of di¤erentiation (i.e.  2 [C () ; M ()]) a retailer cartel is still desirable
for the manufacturer, but he cannot credibly promise to impose an embargo. When di¤erentiation
is relatively high (i.e.  < M ()) and/or retailers have no bargaining power (i.e.  = 0), the
cartel is no longer desirable for the manufacturer and hence he will not cooperate in disciplining
the cartel. In both cases the manufacturers best-response is to permanently supply both retailers,
irrespective of past retailer conduct.
In sum, we nd that given the retailersstrategy, it is optimal for the manufacturer to implement
either the permanent supply strategy (when  = 0 and/or  < M ()) or the embargo strategy
(when 0 <  < 1 and  > M ()). Next, we proceed to evaluate the optimality of the retailer
strategy given the two manufacturer strategies.
Retailer Strategy
Each retailer conditions its pricing behavior in the current period on the manufacturers current
supply decision (Nt), and whether or not a price deviation has taken place in the past (It). The
manufacturers supply decision is either invariant to retailer pricing (i.e. full supply strategy),
or responds only to retail price deviations (It, i.e. embargo strategy). For the retailer there are
therefore four di¤erent subgames to consider which are given by all possible combinations of Nt
and It. Those subgames in which Nt = 1 can be treated jointly, as the price set in this subgame is
ignored by both manufacturer and retailers (i.e. it does not trigger punishment).
In the rst type of retailer subgame, the manufacturer has chosen only to supply a single retailer
in the current period (i.e. Nt = 1), so the downstream market is characterized by a monopoly. The
active retailers strategy implies that it should set the monopoly price. If the retailer should refrain
from doing so, there are no dynamic consequences as neither the strategy of the (other) retailer
nor the manufacturer is conditional upon the pricing decision in the retail monopoly situation.
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The retailers best response is therefore to maximize its current period prot, which is achieved by
charging the monopoly price pC.
In the second type of retailer subgame, the manufacturer has chosen to supply to both retailers
in the current period, but at least one retailer has deviated in the past (i.e. Nt = 2; It = 1).
The retailers strategy implies that it should engage in non-cooperative pricing and charge pNC.
Should the retailer refrain from doing so, there are no dynamic consequences as the relevant strategy
triggers have already been activated by retail price deviation in the past. When the manufacturer
follows the permanent supply strategy, both retailers will be supplied in all subsequent periods,
but the other retailer will revert to non-cooperative pricing. When the manufacturer follows the
embargo strategy, the deviating retailer will no longer be supplied to in the subsequent periods. As
the price set by the retailer does not inuence the future in either case, the retailers best response
is to maximize its current period prot, which is achieved by also charging the non-cooperative
price pNC.
In the last type of retailer subgame, the manufacturer has chosen to supply to both retailers
in the current period, but no retailer has deviated in the past (i.e. Nt = 2; It = 0). The retailers
strategy implies that it should charge the collusive price pC. If the retailer refrains from doing so,
it is punished as the relevant triggers now become activated. When the manufacturer follows the
permanent supply strategy, and hence does not participate in punishment, a deviating retailer is
punished by means of permanent reversion to non-cooperative pricing. A retailer will refrain from
deviating if the present discount value of maintaining the cartel exceeds the present discounted
value of deviating once and being punished by means of non-cooperative pricing subsequently. In
other words, the following inequality should be satised:
1
1  
C
D  DEV D +

1  
NC
D , (32)
which is the case if retailers are su¢ ciently patient, i.e. when
  NC =
DEV D   CD
DEV D   NCD
. (33)
If on the other hand the manufacturer follows the embargo strategy, a deviator is punished by being
permanently cut o¤ from supply. A retailer will refrain from deviating if the present discounted
value from colluding is larger than the present value of deviating and being no longer supplied
subsequently. This requires that
1
1  
C
D  DEV D , (34)
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which is satised if retailers are su¢ ciently patient, i.e. when
  EM = 1 
CD
DEV D
(35)
As the market is di¤erentiated, retailers earn a positive prot during the non-cooperative pricing,
hence NC  EM . Therefore we can state without further proof:
Corollary 9 Cartel stability is guaranteed for a larger set of discount rates when the manufacturer
is willing to impose an embargo. Or discount rates too low for ensuring cartel stability between
retailers if left on their own still can be su¢ ciently high when the manufacturer is willing to impose
an embargo
Combining all the previous ndings then allows to state without further proof the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 10 Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of tacit collusion enforced by
embargo in an hub and spokes environment require that the following set of conditions is satised:
  EM (C.1)
0 <  < 1 (C.2)
 > M () (C.3)
Proposition 10 shows the limited scope of hub and spoke collusion by embargo. First of all,
product di¤erentiation between the retailers needs to be small. This implies strong price competi-
tion as if retailers are nearly perceived as o¤ering the same homogeneous service. Further notice
the restricted range of manufacturer bargaining power that sustains the collusive outcome. There
must be a cap on the manufacturers bargaining power, since otherwise the manufacturer can set
the transfer price freely, and killing o¤ a spoke only leads to a loss in sales. When retailers have
some bargaining power, the characteristics of the retail market and retailer conduct will inuence
the negotiated transfer price. A manufacturer will therefore only cut o¤ a spoke willingly if not
doing so would result in erce retailer competition that would drive down the transfer price all the
way to zero.
Even though the scope of hub and spoke collusion by embargo is limited, the range of parameters
is nonetheless an interesting one. When the degree of retailer di¤erentiation is quite low, competition
is erce and collusion becomes all the more attractive. In such a market deviation is however quite
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Figure 2: Critical discount factors
tempting, as consumers are easily stolen from the competitor, and collusion might therefore be
hard to achieve. The feasibility of the embargo as a ercer punishment can therefore obtain a
collusive outcome in markets in which without it would be very di¢ cult to conspire otherwise.
Comparative Statics
Before concluding this section, we briey summarize the comparative statics of both discount
factors.
Corollary 11 The critical discount factor EM is increasing is (i) independent of  and (ii) in-
creasing in , approaching one as the downstream market becomes undi¤erentiated (i.e.  ! 1).
Corollary 12 The critical discount factor NC is non-monotonic in  and , approaching one as
the downstream market becomes undi¤erentiated (i.e.  ! 1).
Figure 2 demonstrates both Corollaries by plotting the two types of discount factors.
A change in x 2 f; g a¤ects the critical discount factors through potentially three di¤erent
channels:
@
@x
=
@
@DEV D| {z }
>0
@DEV D
@x
+
@
@PD| {z }
>0
@PD
@x
+
@
@CD| {z }
<0
@CD
@x
(36)
The rst channel operates through the prot of deviation, DEV D , which increases the critical
discount factor. The more protable deviation, the more tempting it becomes to deviate. Retailers
therefore have to be more patient in order to refrain from deviating. The second channel operates
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through the punishment prot, PD 2

NCD ; 0
	
, which also increases the critical discount factor.
To discipline the cartel, a punishment is admitted by means of a trigger strategy. In order for this
punishment to be e¤ective, a deviating retailer should earn strictly less than under collusion. The
higher this punishment prot, the less severe the punishment. Retailers therefore have to be more
patient in order to refrain from deviating. The last channel operates through the collusive prot,
CD , which decreases the critical discount factor. The higher the prot from cartelization, the
less attractive deviation becomes. Retailers can therefore be less patient in order to refrain from
deviating.
An increase in bargaining power only e¤ects retailer prots by lowering transfer prices; there is
no direct e¤ect on demand. This increases retailer prots in all regimes (except for the embargo
regime):
@DEV D
@
> 0;
@NCD
@
> 0;
@CD
@
> 0 (37)
such that the overall e¤ect on the critical discount factor is given by
@
@
=
@
@DEV D
@DEV D
@| {z }
>0
+
@
@PD
@PD
@| {z }
0
+
@
@CD
@CD
@| {z }
<0
(38)
As there are both positive and negative e¤ects, the overall impact is a priori ambiguous and depends
on the magnitude of each of the e¤ects. For EM , both e¤ects are equally strong and cancel each
other out. For NC on the other hand, there are both regions in which the critical discount factor
increases in , and regions in which it decreases in .
The degree of substitutability a¤ects retailer prots both directly through the demand curve,
as well as indirectly through the negotiated transfer prices. This has the following e¤ect on retailer
prots
@DEV D
@
7 0; @
NC
D
@
< 0;
@CD
@
< 0 (39)
such that the overall e¤ect on the critical discount factor is given by
@
@
=
@
@DEV D
@DEV D
@| {z }
70
+
@
@PD
@PD
@| {z }
0
+
@
@CD
@CD
@| {z }
>0
(40)
As there are both positive and negative e¤ects, the overall impact is a priori ambiguous and depends
on the magnitude of each of the e¤ects. For EM , the positive e¤ects dominate, and the critical
discount factor is increasing in . For NC on the other hand, there are both regions in which the
critical discount factor increases in , and regions in which it decreases in . Both discount factors
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converge to one when the market becomes undi¤erentiated (i.e. when  ! 1). This is because in
that case the prot of deviation becomes exceedingly large, such that even the harshest punishment
does not su¢ ce to deter deviation.
4 Extensions
Several extensions can be considered and this section only discusses two of them briey. The
obvious ones are those that involve the inclusion of more than three players.
4.1 More than Two Buyers
This is probably an interesting extension that besides quantitative di¤erences also might gener-
ate qualitative di¤erences if competition is local and an incentive problem arises when punishment
needs to be inicted, as in Verboven (1998). Consider the Hotelling model with 3 rms, L, M and
R introduced in that article. Suppose that R deviates. Then it is shown that punishment needs
to be su¢ ciently lenient in order that M is willing to enter the punishment stage of the game for
otherwise M prefers to stay in the collusive mode given that L also still is.
Since the supplier knows the sales made by each and every player in the cartel, the hub immedi-
ately can inict an embargo on R and M will be even better of since he now is the only player that
caters for consumers on the right of the Hotelling line. At the same time the negotiation problem
is mitigated in that absent an agreement on the transfer price between U and M, U still can serve
the consumers in the middle when L expands. Probably the outcome will be that the limited set
of conditions that sustain hub and spoke collusion by embargo is somewhat relaxed.
4.2 More than One Supplier
This extension is tantamount to having the possibility to substitute for an outsidegood, which
means from the perspective of a downstream retailer that the shelves are lled with other items than
those supplied by the hub. This of course immediately reduces the scope of hub and spoke collusion
by embargo since an hub that disciplines a downstream retailer not only will give more bargaining
power to the other downstream retailer but also a boost to the sales of his rival supplier. One needs
moreover to take into account the possibility that a retailer boycotts a particular supplier, making
the bargaining stage of the game even more complex.
Finally, since end consumers in general will have the availability of at least two di¤erent goods
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in each location (at each retailer), one needs to include heterogeneous consumer tastes regarding the
product. Otherwise the product cannot command a positive price and the room for bargaining is
the empty set. The interaction of di¤erences in consumer tastes for the product with heterogeneity
regarding shop locations might entail complex patterns of multi-stop shopping when consumers
compose their bundles in di¤erent ways. For hub and spoke collusion by embargo to stand a
chance, suppliers need to collude in punishing, a non-trivial coordination problem that may need
discipline from still another outside party.
5 Conclusions and Implications for EC Competition Policy
In industries in which there both few suppliers and buyers, transfer prices are likely to be de-
termined by bilateral bargaining between the di¤erent parties. Such negotiations link the transfer
price to the condition and conduct in the downstream market, as buyers operating in a competitive
market would like to avoid a competitive cost disadvantage. When retailer competition is detrimen-
tal for the transfer price, a supplier might prefer to deal with buyers that have more market power
in the downstream market. The supplier might therefore choose to enter into a cartel agreement
with his downstream retailers to help them stabilizing an agreement that would be unsustainable
otherwise. The strategy used would be a threat of refusing to deal. By doing so, the manufacturer
can avoid a vicious price war that would drive down transfer prices if retailers were left on their
own to enforce the cartel. Proposition 10 shows the limitations of the hub and spoke scenario and
thereby indicates how antitrust authorities should be careful when presuming the existence of such
agreements.
More in particular, the range of bargaining power that sustains this type of hub and spoke
collusion is limited. If the seller has substantial bargaining power, the negotiated transfer price will
be close the sellers preferred transfer price (i.e. the double marginalization outcome). By cutting
o¤ a buyer the seller will therefore only incur a loss in sales, which he will never be prepared
to take. Only when buyers have substantial bargain power, such that condition and conduct in
the downstream market a¤ect the negotiated transfer, will the supplier be willing to impose an
embargo.
In addition, only in industries where the retailers are perceived quite alike and there is little
product di¤erentiation between the retail service o¤ered, we nd room for hub and spoke collusion
by embargo. In all other cases, the idea might be appealing but will be hard to realize and some
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antitrust authorities therefore have moved towards dismissing these type of cases, indicating that
much of the fact nding process of the investigative authorities is led by collecting communications
between lower sales people over a hub and spoke network, but which hardly seems to have any
e¤ect.
This approach which investigates the alleged collusive mechanism in the appropriate industry
context makes a lot of sense. Unfortunately EC Competition Policy more and more tends to miss
this point. Rather than starting from the foundations of an economic model that casts competition
(or collusion) in an industry to place the evidence into context, the starting point tends to be
a narrative of the talk of the (cartelized) town. A series of information exchanges between a
varying set of players over a period of time then tends to get lumped into a single continuous
infringement. The varying group of players that are seen to interact in a collusive conspiracy
can be horizontal competitors (say A with B and B with C), or vertical ones (both upstream and
downstream say A with its supplier U or C with a major customer D).
This article contributed to the investigations into the blends of a vertical agreement with an
horizontal one, to dampen intra-, interbrand competition, or both, see the literature survey in the
rst section. The focus here was on a cartel mechanism called hub and spoke collusion by embargo
that is used to soften intrabrand competition between downstream retailers. Fierce competition in
the downstream market can be detrimental for transfer prices. In that case the goals of upstream
and downstream rms vis-a-vis downstream market power become aligned, and hence the question
of how an upstream player can help in generating downstream market power (by collusion) becomes
all the more relevant.
The results show that this blend indeed can achieve a collusive outcome, but also indicates
the many limitations. Given the role that dominant buyers and suppliers have in settings where
cartels might thrive, this type of modelling that includes both horizontal and vertical relations at
the same time will undoubtedly gure more prominently in the literature on collusion. Hopefully,
future policy making will take these contributions into account.
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6 Appendix
Throughout the proofs we will assume that numerical root nding algorithms may be used to nd
the roots of univariate polynomials.
Proof of Proposition 5
The manufacturer prefers to deal with a retail cartel over a non-cooperative duopoly i¤
C = CU   NCU > 0, (41)
where
CU =
1  2
4 (1 + )
(42)
NCU =
x (; )
y (; )
(43)
x (; ) = 2 (1  ) (2   (1 + )) (44)

h
2   (1 + ) + 

2   (1 + ) (1  )2
i
y (; ) = (2  ) (1 + ) [4   (1 + ) (2   (2  ))]2 (45)
We now proceed in two steps. In step (i), we derive our results in terms of , which boils down
to nding the roots of C in terms of . We show that if  2 (0; 0:6330) then for all  2 (0; 1) we
have that C < 0, whereas if  2 (0:6330; 1), there exists a unique C () such that C > 0 i¤
 > C (). In step (ii), we derive our results in terms of , for which we have to nd the roots of
C in terms of . We show that for every  2 (0; 1) there exists a unique C () such that C > 0
i¤  > C (). Combined step (i) and (ii) imply that C () is a strictly decreasing function, hence
C () is strictly decreasing as well.
Step (i)
Note that when the manufacturer has all bargaining power, we have that
CU ( = 0) =
1
4 (1 + )
(46)
NCU ( = 0) =
1
2 (2  ) (1 + ) 
1
4 (1 + )
(47)
so unless retailers are completely independent (i.e.  = 0), the manufacturer always prefers to
deal with the non-cooperative duopoly (i.e. C < 0). Multiplying CU by y (; ), the sign of 
C
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depends on the sign of the function fC (; ) = CU  y  x. This function is a polynomial of order
4 in terms of , i.e.
fC (; ) =
4X
i=0
aCi () 
i; (48)
which always has a root at  = 1 (as in that case CU = 
NC
U = 0). When ordered consecutively,
the coe¢ cients of fC change sign twice:
aC4 ()| {z }
 
aC3 ()| {z }
 
aC2 ()| {z }
+
aC1 ()| {z }
 
aC0 ()| {z }
 
By Descartesrule of signs, the function fC therefore has two strictly positive roots in terms of ,
and the rst root lies at  = 1. The second root lies in the interval (0; 1) if  2 (0:6330; 1), and in
the interval (1;1) if  2 (0; 0:6330). To see this, it su¢ ces to look at
@fC
@
j=1 = 1
2
 [2   (1  )] 2  2 [4   (1 + ) (6   (4  ))] (49)
> 0 i¤  2 (0; 0:6330) , and
lim
!1 f
C = lim
!1 a4 () 
4 =  1 (50)
Whenever  2 (0; 1), the function fC thus converges to  1. If the derivative at the rst root
( = 1) is positive, fC must have another root in the interval (1;1). If the derivative at the rst
root is negative, fC can not have another root in the interval (1;1), since in that case it must
have two roots in the interval. By the number of sign changes this cannot be the case, so fC must
therefore have a root in the interval (0; 1) :
Step (ii)
The function fC (; ) is also a polynomial of order 9 in terms of , i.e.
fC (; ) =
9X
i=0
bCi () 
i; (51)
Whenever  2 (0; 1), this function has a unique root C () in the interval (0:633; 1). The proof
of this result is, however, quite lengthy (as Decartesrule of signs no longer su¢ ces) so we only
provide a sketch. The proof is an application of Sturms theorem, a result which pins down the
exact number of real roots of a given polynomial within a certain interval.10 Applying Sturms
theorem, we nd that fC (; ) has a unique root in the interval  2 (0:633; 1) :
Sketch of the proof
10See Rahman and Schmeisser (2002) for a detailed exposition of Sturms theorem.
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Figure 3: Sign changes
 Step (i): Create a Sturm chain p0 () ; p1 () ; : : : ; p9 () for the polynomial fC (; ) using the
following procedure:
 p0 () = fC (; )
 p1 () = @fC (; ) =@
 pl () =  rem(pl 2 () ; pl 1 ()) for l 2 f2; : : : ; 9g, where rem(pl 2 () ; pl 1 ()) is the
remainder when polynomial long division is used to divide pl 2 () by pl 1 ().
 Step (ii): Evaluate the Sturm chain p0 () ; p1 () ; : : : ; p9 () in  = 0:633 and  = 1, and
count the number of consecutive sign changes in both chains. Denote these sign changes by
0:633 () and 1 (), which are plotted in gure 3.
 Step (iii): By Sturms theorem, the di¤erence in the number of sign changes between both
chains is equal to the number of real roots in the interval  2 (0:633; 1). Verify that 0:633 () 
1 () = 1 for all  2 (0; 1), which implies there is a unique real root in the interval  2
(0:633; 1).
The manufacturer prefers to deal with a retail monopoly over a non-cooperative duopoly i¤
M = MU   NCU > 0, (52)
where
MU =
1
8
 
1  2 (53)
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Following exactly the same procedure as before we can show that the roots of M are qualitatively
the same as those of C : The only di¤erence is that now only when  2 (0:736; 1), there exist a
unique M () such that 
M > 0 i¤  > M (). Similarly, there exists a unique 

M () such that
C > 0 i¤  > M (). As CU  MU , it is clear that C  M , hence M ()  C () and
M ()  C ().
Downstream prot derivatives
All downstream prots are decreasing in the transfer price g, which is decreasing in retailer bar-
gaining power . An increase in  therefore increases CD ; 
NC
D ; and 
DEV 
D . An increase in degree
of substitution  has the following e¤ect on downstream prots:
@CD
@
=   1  
2
4 (1 + )2
< 0 (54)
@DEV D
@
=
1
64
(1 + )2 2 (2  ) (2   1) 1 
1  22 > 0 i¤  2

0;
1
2

(55)
@NCD
@
< 0 (56)
To see that the last inequality holds, write downstream prots in full:
NCD =
l (; )
m (; )
=
(1  )
n
2   (1 + )
h
1 +  (1  )2
i
+ 2
o2
(1 + )
n
8  
h
8  

 (2  )2 (1 + )  2 (1  )
io2 (57)
Now dene
h (; ) =
@l
@
m  @m
@
l, (58)
such that
SIGN(
@NCD
@
) = SIGN(h (; )). (59)
The function h (; ) can be rewritten as a product of the following three functions
h1 = (2  ) > 0 (60)
h2 = (4   (1 + ) (2   (2  ))) > 0 (61)
h3 = c3 () 
3 + c2 () 
2 + c1 ()  + c0 () < 0 (62)
such that h (; ) < 0. The inequality h3 < 0 follows from the fact that all cis are negative.
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